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A B S T R A C T
This study uses longitudinal administrative data from the Netherlands to explore the responsiveness of disabled
workers to financial incentives. We focus on workers with partial Disability Insurance (DI) benefits that have
substantial residual work capacities. When the first phase of benefit entitlement to DI has expired, these workers
experience a dramatic drop in income if they do not employ their residual income capacity. Entitlement periods
to the first phase of DI benefits vary across individuals. This enables us to estimate the impact effect of this
change in work incentives on the incidence of work, on wage earnings and on full work resumption. Based on
the estimation results, the implied labor force non-participation elasticity rate equals 0.12. Response estimates
are highest among young DI recipients, who typically have shorter entitlement periods to the more generous
first phase of DI benefits. The incentive change has a limited impact on wage earnings of partially disabled
workers and no significant impact on full work resumption.
1. Introduction
In recent years, increasing attention has been devoted to the design
of work incentives for disabled workers (OECD, 2010). Several studies
indicate the presence of residual work capacities among Disability
Insurance (DI) recipients that are left unused as a result of high
implicit tax rates (see e.g. Bound, 1999, and Maestas et al., 2014). At
the same time, Autor and Duggan (2006) and Bütler et al. (2015) argue
that vouchers like the Ticket-to-Work program in for Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI) in the US and lump-sum payments in
Switzerland— as a complement to DI benefits— do not compensate for
perverse insurance incentives. Thus, policymakers are in search for
better-targeted and more effective incentive schemes for DI recipients.
This study explores how dramatic increases in financial incentives
during the benefit spell affect the employment, wage earnings and DI
exits of partially disabled workers. Our analysis uses registered data
from disabled workers in the Netherlands between 2006 and 2013 who
are deemed to have substantial residual earning capacities; this group
constitutes about 16% of the total inflow into DI.1 In the first phase of
DI benefit entitlement — the so-called ‘wage-related period ’— an
individual receives supplementary Unemployment Insurance (UI)
benefits if his or her residual earning capacity is left unused. This
ensures total benefit payments of at least 70% of the individual's pre-
disability wage earnings. When wage-related DI benefits are exhausted
and the ‘continuation period’ starts, DI benefit levels remain constant if
an individual employs at least 50% of his or her residual earning
capacity. If the 50% requirement is not met, however, DI benefit levels
are linked to the level of minimum wages instead of pre-disability
wages. This ‘kink’ in the level of DI benefits, combined with the
simultaneous termination of income from supplementary UI benefits,
induces a strong incentive to work in the continuation period,
particularly for workers with high pre-disability earnings.
Our analysis exploits the fact that the length of the wage-related
period of DI recipients depends on the work history of a worker. This
induces substantial variation in the duration of benefit entitlement —
from three months at minimum to 60 months at maximum in the time
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period under consideration.2 Assuming that the exact timing of the
incentive change at the moment of benefit exhaustion is unrelated to
changes in the ability to work, we disentangle incentive effects from
duration dependency effects that affect the prevalence of work and
wage earnings. We carefully model the evolution of the duration
dependency effects in individual panel regressions. We use flexible
specifications for baseline patterns for outcome variables across
separate age groups, as the age of individuals is correlated to the
length of the wage-related period and may also affect the recovery
patterns of DI recipients over the benefit spell.
We add to a strand of literature that addresses the effects of
financial work incentives on workers who are enrolled in DI schemes.
For recent studies in this field, see Kostol and Mogstad (2014),
Campolieti and Riddell (2012), and Weathers and Hemmeter
(2011).3 Specifically, our paper makes three important contributions
that are linked to the unique design of partial DI benefits in the
Netherlands. First, changes in work incentives do not stem from wage
subsidies or vouchers that supplement DI benefits, but rather from
benefit reductions for disabled workers without sufficient employment
earnings. If workers dislike losses in income more than they like
income gains, one would thus expect higher work responses to the
incentive change (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Second, the incen-
tives we study are targeted at workers that are deemed to have residual
earning capacities. We thus are the first to study the effect of financial
incentives that are embedded in partial DI schemes — as opposed to
the more general DI schemes that are used in most OECD countries
(OECD, 2010). Finally, the set-up of the partial DI system induces
strong differences in the observed incentive changes when the wage-
related period ends, which allows us to study whether incentive
responses are proportional to the size of the incentive change.
Our main finding is that the change in work incentives at the end of
the wage-related period leads to a 2.5 percentage-point increase in
work incidence. This effect corresponds to a labor force non-participa-
tion elasticity estimate of 0.12. This estimate is close to estimates of
Kostol and Mogstad (2014), who find elasticity estimates between 0.1
and 0.3 for the work incidence of disabled workers in Norway. We thus
find no evidence that response effects to the change in incentives were
higher for the sample of partial DI recipients in the Netherlands — at
least, not when comparing them to the full population of disabled
workers in Norway. One possible explanation for this is that participa-
tion rates were already high in the group of DI recipients at the start of
their DI spell, causing the remaining group of disabled workers without
employment to be less responsive to the incentive change.
We also find strong evidence that labor supply effects at the
extensive margin are proportional to the size of the incentive change.
That is, higher drops in the replacement rate for partially disabled
workers at the moment of benefit exhaustion yield higher labor
responses. The estimated effects on wage earnings suggest that most
of the behavioral effects are channeled by increases in labor supply at
the extensive margin — and not by increases in hours worked.
Moreover, the limited and insignificant effects that we find for the
incentive change on full work resumption indicate that partially
disabled workers preferred supplementing their partial DI benefits by
wage earnings to being fully employed while receiving wage earnings
only. This is in line with analyses of Campolieti and Riddell (2012) for
Canada, and Weathers and Hemmeter (2011) for the US, who conclude
that earnings disregards lead to employment effects but not to
increases in exits from SSDI.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains
the institutional background of the Dutch DI scheme for partially
disabled workers, as well as the expected impact of the partial DI
program on work, wage earnings and the likelihood of leaving the
scheme. Sections 3 and 4 present the data and the empirical strategy
and Section 5 discusses our estimation results. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
2. Institutional background
2.1. Disability determination and the DI benefit programs4
Since its inception in 1967, the Disability Insurance (DI) program
in the Netherlands is a public scheme that is mandatory for all workers.
DI benefits provide insurance for 70 percent of the loss of income due
to disabilities of any kind, regardless of their cause. Workers apply for
DI benefits after two years of sickness absence. DI claims are assessed
and DI premiums are set by the Dutch public Employee Insurance
Agency (UWV). UWV determines the presence of impairments, the
remaining earning capacity and the resulting degree of disability as a
percentage of a worker's pre-disability wage.
To assess an individual's degree of disability, an insurance doctor
and a UWV-designated labor market expert select a set of at least nine
regular jobs that meet the worker's physical and mental impairments
and current level of education. These jobs are derived from a database
called CBBS (the ‘Client Administration and Assurance System’), which
contains about 7000 jobs that are located at about 3500 firms (UWV,
2013). Each job is described by an educational level, work pattern,
labor experience and 55 types of work strains that may or may not be
relevant. The earning capacity of an individual is set equal to the
median value of average wage rates of the nine selected jobs; the
disability degree that follows from this is equal to the loss of earning
capacity as a percentage of the pre-disability wage. Individual workers
are subsequently assigned to six disability classes with the following
degree intervals: 0–35%, 35%-45%, 45%-55%, 55%-65%, 65%-80%,
and 80%-100%.
Workers with disability degrees that are lower than 35% are not
entitled to any DI benefits. As we will argue later on, this may cause a
‘cash-cliff’ in total income. That is, if a worker that initially was deemed
to earn less than 65% of pre-disability earnings starts receiving a wage
which is more than 65% of his or her pre-disability earnings, this will
ultimately lead to the full loss of DI benefits.
Workers with disability degrees between 35% and 80% receive
partial DI benefits. This group typically has mental and behavioral
disorders, musculoskeletal impairments or circulatory system diseases
(Koning and Lindeboom, 2015). For each of the four disability degree
intervals between 35% and 80%, the benefit level of these workers is
based on its central value; this corresponds to 40%, 50%, 60% and
72.5% of pre-disability earnings, respectively. Using intervals of
disability degrees in this way implies that wage earnings may exceed
the earnings capacity regularly without adaptations in the registration
of disability degrees. As long as the disability degree that follows from
the wage earnings remains in the relevant interval for disability
degrees, the initial earnings capacity that is registered will not be
adapted and the benefit level thus remains unaffected.
Workers are classified as fully disabled if their degree of disability
exceeds 80%. If impairments for this group are regarded as temporary,
workers receive full DI benefits — amounting to 70% of their pre-
2 The wage-related period of DI benefits is unrestricted for workers who are awarded
full DI benefits. The length of the wage-related period is not related to the earning
capacity (but benefits are related to the loss of the earning capacity, of course).
3 When taking a broader perspective, incentive effects are also studied by comparing
DI applicants who are awarded with benefits with those who are rejected (Bound, 1999;
Maestas et al., 2013; Chen and van der Klaauw, 2008; Moore, 2015; Autor et al., 2014;
French and Song, 2014). In addition, some studies exploit variation in DI benefits over
time or between regions to examine effects on DI enrolment or DI return-to-work rates
(Gruber, 2000; Autor and Duggan, 2003; Campolieti, 2004; Fevang et al., 2013).
4 The Dutch DI benefit system contrasts to most other countries that do not allow for
partial DI benefit schemes. Among OECD countries, the Czech Republic, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Korea, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland are other
countries which award DI benefits with levels that are related to the loss of earnings
capacity (OECD 2010).
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disability earnings — but they are medically re-assessed after some
years in the same way as for the initial assessment. Similar to workers
with partial benefits, mental and musculoskeletal impairments and
diseases of the circulatory system are most common among the DI
recipient group designated 'fully and temporarily' disabled. Finally,
workers that are assessed as ‘fully and permanently’ disabled receive
full DI benefits that equal 75% of their pre-disability earnings. For this
group, cancers and strokes are the most frequent diagnoses.
Since the introduction in 2006 of separate DI schemes for partially
disabled workers, fully and temporarily disabled workers and fully and
permanently disabled workers, DI inflow rates in the Netherlands have
remained more or less constant over time (Koning and Lindeboom,
2015). Even though annual UI inflow rates more than doubled during
the recession that started in 2009, the annual overall DI inflow rate
remained stable at around 0.5% of the insured population. Also, the
respective contributions of partially disabled workers (0.1%), fully and
temporarily disabled (0.2%) and fully and permanently disabled work-
ers (0.2%) have been quite stable over the years (UWV, 2016). In
contrast to empirical analyses that have been conducted for the
Netherlands with data for the nineties, this indicates that DI benefits
are no longer a viable alternative to long-term unemployment benefits
(see e.g. Koning and van Vuuren, 2007).
2.2. The level and duration of partial DI benefits
Partially disabled workers in the Netherlands receive DI benefits in
two successive phases: the wage-related period and the continuation
period. Fig. 1 depicts how the entitlement length to the wage-related
period increases with respect to the number of employment history
years. Until 2008, increases in the length of entitlement followed a step
function of the employment history, with 60 months of entitlement
length at maximum. Since 2008, the length of the wage-related period
is a linear function of employment years — with one additional year of
employment resulting in one additional month of benefit entitlement
and a maximum length of 38 months.
In the wage-related period of benefits, the partial DI scheme and the
partial UI scheme function as complementary benefits. Accordingly, the
length of entitlement connected to this period — where benefits are
related to pre-disability earnings— is equal for both benefit types. In the
continuation period of DI benefits, DI benefit levels remain linked to
pre-disability earnings if an individual employs at least 50% of his or her
residual earning capacity. If the 50% requirement is not met, however,
DI benefit levels become linked to the level of the statutory minimum
wage instead of pre-disability wages. For most workers, this induces a
strong increase in the incentive to exploit the residual earning capacity,
With partial DI benefits that are complemented with partial UI
benefits in the wage-related period of DI benefits, workers receive total
benefits from DI and UI that are equal to 70% of the pre-disability
wages at minimum, rendering the exact level of the disability degree
irrelevant for workers without wage earnings. We define the worker's
pre-disability wage as Wp and d as the disability degree of the relevant
disability category of the worker, with 0.35 ≤ d < 0.80 (this is the
range of disability degrees with entitlement to partial benefits). The
total benefit income in the wage-related period (WRP) while being
unemployed (u) then equals5:
Income dW d W W= 0.7 + 0.7(1 − ) = 0.7u
WRP
p p p (1)
Now suppose we compare this income with the total income from
benefits and wage earnings when the earnings capacity of the worker is
used to it full extent. This yields the following income level for
employed (e) workers in the wage-related period:
Income dW d W= 0.7 + (1 − )e
WRP
p p (2)
Based on Eqs. (1) and (2), we can derive the replacement rate of full
usage of the earning capacity, also known as the ‘average participation
tax rate’. In the current context, we will refer to this variable as the
‘conditional’ replacement rate (CRR), as we condition on a given level
of the disability degree category level of the worker (d). In the wage-
related period, the conditional replacement rate of employing the
earnings capacity makes clear that work incentives only vary with

















When turning to the continuation phase of DI benefits, we have to
bear in mind that workers without wage earnings do no longer receive
DI benefits that are linked to pre-disability earnings but on the
statutory minimum wage instead. Moreover, the receipt of comple-
mentary UI benefits has ended. Defining the statutory minimum wage
as Wm, the total income from benefits for unemployed workers in the
continuation period of DI, Income ,u




We stated earlier that the total income from benefits and wage
earnings remains unaffected if the worker fully exploits his or her
earning capacity. We thus can derive the conditional replacement rate












































This equation makes apparent that the conditional replacement
rates decreases if one switches from the wage-related period to the
continuation period of DI benefits. This change in the incentive to work
increases in pre-disability earnings and decreases with respect to the
disability degree of a worker.
2.3. Effects of the incentive change for a representative worker
To analyze the employment choices partially disabled workers are
facing in greater detail, we now consider the specific case of a
representative worker. We assume that the annual pre-disability earn-
ings of this worker are equal to 34,500 Euros, which was the average
wage income in the Netherlands in 2013. We also assume that the
worker has a partner with substantial wage earnings, so there is no
Fig. 1. Employment history (in years) and DI benefit entitlement (in months) to the
wage-related period.
5 For expositional reasons, we abstract from the fact that there is a maximum premium
wage by which pre-disability earnings can be capped. We also abstract from any
supplementary benefits from social assistance (see Section 3.1 that describes the data
set-up).
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entitlement to supplementary social assistance benefits if the total
income drops below the social minimum level in the Netherlands.
Finally, we assume that the earning capacity that is measured is equal
to its true value. As a result, wage earnings cannot be higher than the
earning capacity. As we will argue on, we need to drop this assumption
in order to explain exits from partial DI to full work resumption.
In what follows, we first analyze the decision of the worker to use
his or her earnings capacity to its full extent, or not. Next, we assume a
fixed level of the disability degree, so as to analyze the work decision at
the intensive margin. We finally assess whether the incentive change
may affect the likelihood of full work resumption and the loss of DI
benefits.
2.3.1. Work incidence
To shed more light on the work decision at the extensive margin,
Fig. 2 depicts the conditional replacement rate of the representative
worker in the wage-related period and in the continuation period. The
y-axis indicates the conditional replacement rate, expressed in percen-
tage values. The x-axis indicates the degree of disability, also expressed
in percentage values.
We first consider the conditional replacement rate in the wage-
related period. Without any loss of earnings capacity — i.e., a disability
degree of 0% — the loss of wage earnings due to unemployment is
replaced by UI benefits by 70%. Up to the threshold level of a disability
degree of 35%, however, the corresponding losses of wage earnings are
not compensated by any DI benefits. As a result, the conditional
replacement rate rises to the level of 105% at the threshold value. For
disability degrees between 35% and 80%, the worker is entitled to DI
benefits. Since work resumption no longer implies the loss of DI
benefits, it becomes more rewarding to exploit the earning capacity to
its full extent; this is reflected by lower conditional replacement rates.
Still, the gains from working are not substantial, particularly if the
disability degree is close to 80%.
When the wage-related period ends and the continuation phase
starts, we observe a decline in the conditional replacement rate for all
disability degrees below the threshold of 80%. Below the threshold of
35%, the worker does not receive any income from UI or DI benefits;
the conditional replacement rate is thus zero for this range of values of
disability degrees. Moreover, partial DI benefits are related to the
statutory minimum wage instead of pre-disability earnings if the
worker is not employed. For a given disability degree that meets the
35%-threshold, this implies a strong decrease in the conditional
replacement rate of the representative worker.
2.3.2. Wage earnings
Obviously, the worker in the above-mentioned example may
consider more options than fully exploiting his or her residual earning
capacity or not having any wage earnings at all. Fig. 3 therefore
addresses the work decision at the intensive margin for the represen-
tative worker — but now with a degree of disability that is fixed at 50%.
The worker is thus entitled to partial DI benefits and the residual
earning capacity is equal to 17,250 Euros per year. Recall that we
assume the earning capacity is measured correctly and exogenous to
the worker. As such, the choice the worker faces is on the percentage
usage of his or her residual earning capacity.
Fig. 3 shows that the marginal tax rate of increasing work hours is
equal to 70% in the wage-related period of benefit receipt; this
reflects the fact that higher earnings are tapered by lower UI
benefits. When the continuation period of DI benefits commences,
however, the marginal tax rate decreases for all possible values of the
percentage usage of the earning capacity. This can be explained by
two changes in benefit conditions. First, any increases in wage
earnings are no longer tapered by lower UI benefits. This induces
a stronger incentive to increase working hours for all usage levels of
the earning capacity. Second, there is a discrete jump — or, ‘kink’ —
in the level of DI benefits if the worker uses 50% of his or her earning
capacity. We thus expect the worker to increase working hours if he
or she is able to, particularly to usage levels the exceed 50% of the
earning capacity.
2.3.3. Full work resumption
Suppose that the representative worker initially has a disability
degree that exceeds the 35%-threshold, but that his or her ‘true’
earning capacity increases to a level where the threshold condition is
not met anymore. We thus no longer assume that the earning
capacity is measured correctly and constant over time. If the worker
now decides to increase wage earnings to the new level of the earning
capacity, this will ultimately lead to a medical re-assessment and the
loss of DI benefits. Thus, the representative worker essentially faces
the dilemma to reveal his or her true earning capacity and increase
wage earnings while losing DI benefits, or continue receiving DI
benefits while having wage earnings equal to the initial earning
capacity. In this context, the full loss of DI benefits induces a ‘cash-
cliff’ that deters the worker from increasing working hours.
We stated earlier that the income level from DI benefits and wage
earnings at the initial level of the earning capacity remains constant
when the continuation period commences. Also, the income value
from full work resumption will not change either. Accordingly, we
Fig. 2. Conditional replacement rates for a worker with pre-disability wage earnings of
€34,500, as a function of disability degrees; both for wage-related period and continua-
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Fig. 3. Total annual income from wage earnings and DI and UI benefits of a worker with
pre-disability wage earnings of €34,500 and a disability degree of 50%; both for wage-
related period and continuation period of DI benefits.
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hypothesize that the exit rate out of DI benefits remains unaffected.6
If any, increases in working hours are more likely to occur up to the
level of the initial earning capacity — as argued in Section 2.3.2.
3. Data
3.1. Data setup
Our analysis uses registered individual worker information from
UWV. We have monthly observations of all of the disabled workers who
entered the partial DI scheme between January 2006 and June 2010.
These recipients are followed as long as they remain in the scheme, up
to and including December 2013. Our sample consists of almost
700,000 monthly records and 13,063 unique individuals7 — for whom
we observe several individual characteristics, as well as the length of
the wage-related period of DI benefits, degree of disability, residual
earning capacity, type of impairment, pre-disability wage and current
wage earnings.
Information on individual pre-disability wages and degree of
disability can be used as inputs to derive the conditional replacement
rates in our sample. In doing so, however, we need to make closing
assumptions regarding the receipt of supplementary benefits if income
levels drop below the social minimum. In particular, partially disabled
workers who do not work in the continuation phase will receive DI
benefits that are below the minimum income level in the Netherlands.
This level amounts to 70% of the minimum wage (€ 12,400 in 2013) for
single households and 100% of the minimum wage (€ 17,700 in 2013)
for couples, respectively. Without any income from a partner, workers
may thus qualify for supplementary social assistance benefits.
Unfortunately, our data do not contain information on partner
income or owned assets that determine eligibility to supplementary
benefits. This prevents us reconstructing conditional replacement rates
for employed workers with sufficient wage earnings. Still, we observe
the receipt of income supplements from social assistance for indivi-
duals without wage earnings, which enables us to derive two rules of
thumb for the construction of conditional replacement rates. To avoid
any biases in the construction of our data, we apply these rules to all
individuals. The first rule is that none of the individuals that are
married receive income supplements. This assumption stems from the
observation that only 18% of married individuals without wage earn-
ings in our sample received income supplements in the continuation
phase. The second assumption is that all unmarried individuals receive
income supplements from social assistance, up to 70% of the statutory
minimum wage. With 58% of the individuals that are not married and
do not have wage earnings receiving income supplements in the
continuation phase, this assumption is more restrictive than the first
one. In our analysis, we therefore perform a robustness test with
respect to the presence of measurement errors. We return to this issue
in Section 5.
3.2. Data description
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the variables of partially
disabled workers in our sample at different points in time and for
different samples. These statistics concern (i) the full sample, measured
at the first month of DI benefits; (ii) the sample of individuals that exit
DI at some point in time, measured at the first month of DI benefit
receipt; (iii/iv) the sample of individuals who experienced the incentive
change, measured one month before and one month after the wage-
related period ended. Observed variables include gender, age, marital
status, pre-disability earnings, disability degree, length of entitlement
to the wage-related period, residual earning capacity, type of impair-
ment and current wage earnings. In this respect, it should be noted that
the residual earning capacity of workers is measured at the start of the
DI benefit period. This value can change only when wage earnings are
found to exceed the initial residual earning capacity for a longer period
of time.
At the start of the DI benefit spell, 53.5% of the partially disabled
workers in our sample received wage earnings in the time period under
investigation. For these workers, the average wage earnings amounted
to 68.6 Euros per day, which is 55% of the average of pre-disability
wages. For individuals that leave DI benefits over time (constituting
about one-third of our sample), we observe the outflow destination
Table 1
Sample statistics of the inflow of partially disabled benefit recipients (2006–2013).




change at t = T :
t = T - 1 t = T + 1
Number of individual
observations
13,063 3,761 11,385 11,385
Male (%) 54.1 56.2 53.1 53.1
Married (%) 54.5 56.2 53.9 53.9
Age categories (%)
< 35 years 14.5 16.0 14.8 15.0
35–44 years 24.2 23.1 25.0 25.4
45–54 years 33.9 22.0 35.6 35.8
55–65 years 27.4 38.9 24.6 23.8
Grade of disability (%)
35–45% 33.3 34.8 32.3 31.9
46–55% 30.4 29.1 30.5 30.6
56–65% 18.7 18.9 18.9 19.1
66–80% 17.7 17.3 18.2 18.3
Impairment types (%)
Neoplasms 7.7 11.1 7.2 7.6
Mental and behavioral
disorders
34.9 32.7 35.0 35.0
Diseases of the circulatory
system
16.0 16.9 15.6 15.9
Diseases of musculoskeletal
system
15.6 15.5 15.7 15.5




125.3 117.6 131.6 131.8
Working status (%) 53.5 47.2 57.7 58.7
Working, more than 50% of
earning capacity (%)
44.7 45.4 54.1 52.8
Earnings, euros per day 31.8 33.4 42.2 43.2
Earnings, euros per day (if
working)
68.6 71.1 74.2 74.7
Residual earning capacity,
euros per day
60.0 60.1 60.5 60.2
Conditional replacement
rate (%)
82.9 66.1 84.1 36.7
Length wage-related period
(months)






aNote the sample statistics that are measured in the last month of DI benefit receipt are
based on uncensored DI benefit spells only.
6 Using ex ante calculations on the new disability law in 2006, Van Sonsbeek and
Gradus (2006) argue that the increased work incentive will not lower the total number of
DI benefit recipients, but only increase the likelihood of employment of this group. This
is due to the 35%-cash-cliff that deters employed DI recipients from leaving the scheme.
7 Between January 2006 and June 2010, approximately 116,000 people entered the DI
scheme, the vast majority of these individuals being fully disabled. Only 19,000 (16%) of
DI awards were deemed partially disabled initially. Moreover, about 3,000 individuals
were re-assessed as fully disabled in some months after the initial assessment, due to
either deterioration in medical condition or appeals. As the incentive change after the
first phase of DI benefits is not relevant for this group, we selected only those workers
who remain partially disabled in all observed periods.
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(recovery, pension, deceased, or other). About half of these individuals
are no longer entitled to DI benefits, as they have recovered; this
typically occurs if they start earning wages that exceed 65% of their
pre-disability wage.
From our data, we infer that annual exit rates due to work
resumption are around 2%. Even though we focus on workers with
earning capacities, this rate comes close to annual DI exit rates that are
observed for comparable OECD countries (2010).8 When comparing
the second- and third columns in Table 1, we find that individuals
leaving the DI scheme tend to be male, older, married and having
higher pre-disability wage earnings; this reflects the fact that older
workers are more likely to retire and have a higher mortality rate.
Figs. 4 and 5 shed more light on the timing and the size of the work
incentive changes that are observed in our data, respectively. In
particular, Fig. 4 shows histograms of the entitlement lengths to the
wage-related period of DI benefit receipt, both in the period before and
after 2008. We argued earlier that these entitlement lengths followed
from a step function for intervals in employment history until 2008.
Consequently, we observe spikes in the distribution of entitlement
lengths at 12, 18, 24, 36, 48 and 60 months until 2008.9 Since 2008,
however, we observe spikes only at 0 months of DI benefit entitlement
(if there is no wage-related benefit entitlement) and 38 months of DI
benefit entitlement (if the maximum length of benefit entitlement
applies). In addition, Fig. 5 shows the empirical distribution of the
changes in the individuals’ conditional replacement rates at the
moment of the incentive change. The figure shows a large variation
in the change in the conditional replacement rates, ranging from zero
to decreases of values close to 90 percentage-points. The average drop
in conditional replacement rates is 47.4 percentage-points (from 84.1%
to 36.7%). The large variation predominantly stems from variation in
pre-disability earnings and, to a lesser extent, variation in disability
degrees.
Finally, Fig. 6 shows the distribution of the usage percentages of the
earning capacity of employed individuals in our data, measured three
months before and after incentive change. Both figures do not suggest
the presence of ‘bunching’ effects of usage percentages just above the
threshold of 50%. At the same time, we do observe a spike at the point
where workers employ 100% of their earning capacity; this reflects the
fact that a substantial group of workers that already worked at the start
of DI receipt have their earning capacities set equal to the wage
earnings they receive at that moment. We also observe a substantial
group of the workers with wage earnings exceeding their registered
earnings capacity. This observation largely stems from the fact that
small, positive deviations from the initial disability degree do not lead
to changes in the assignment to the discrete disability degree classes.
Only for a small group of workers the earnings capacity will ultimately
be adapted by UWV.
4. Empirical strategy
4.1. Identification strategy
The key challenge in our analysis is to identify and estimate changes
in outcome measures that result from the change in incentives that
workers are faced with. Stated differently, we aim to disentangle
incentive effects from other (unrelated) changes in the ability to work.
We do so by exploiting the variation in the length of the wage-related
period of individual workers, allowing us to compare changes in
outcome measures of ‘treated’ individuals who are close to or after
the end of the wage-related period with those of the control group of
individuals who are not or not yet affected by the incentive change.
When following this estimation strategy, we need two assumptions
to be met. First, individuals should have common baseline patterns of
work incidence and wage earnings over the DI benefit spell. If not,
behavioral changes around the incentive change may be confounded by
differences in baseline patterns. We therefore allow for flexible baseline
specifications over the DI benefit spell, both over time and between age
categories. In this respect, we argue that age is one of the main drivers
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Fig. 4. Distribution of wage-related DI benefit entitlement periods of inflow cohorts of
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Fig. 5. Empirical distribution of the change in conditional replacement rates, measured
at the moment of exhaustion of the wage-related period of DI benefits (N = 11,385).
8 According to OECD (2010), only Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand
show higher DI exit rates due to work resumption than other countries. Note also that DI
exit rates due to full work resumption were substantially higher in the Netherlands until
2006, when the sickness period had not yet been extended from one to two years (Van
Sonsbeek and Gradus, 2013).
9 Note that observed entitlement periods that are not at these spikes stem from the fact
that workers may have experienced earlier benefit periods.
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Our second key assumption is that relevant behavioral changes
occur in a specific timeframe around the incentive change. As such, we
implicitly assume that workers could respond to the incentive change at
reasonably short notice.10 If this assumption does not hold, however,
zooming into the incentive change may lead to underestimation of the
total impact of the incentive change on our outcome measures. As we
will show later on, our model specification therefore allows for
coefficient estimates that are based on various time windows around
the incentive change. This does not only capture anticipation and
adaptation effects, but also gives us guidance regarding the proper
support that is needed to consider the incentive change.
4.2. Specification of work incidence and wages
In our analysis, we specify the work prevalence, Y, and wage
earnings W of an individual i (i = 1,.N ) who enters into DI at calendar
time τ both as linear panel regressions. Individuals have age ai, with
maximum entitlement to the wage-related period that is represented by
Ti, and an elapsed DI benefit duration t . This yields the following panel
regressions for the full sample of partially disabled individuals:
∑βY a t T α I a a a ψ t
γ I T T t T T
γ I t T T ε
( , , ) = + + ( < ≤ ) ( )
+ ( − ∆ < ≤ + ∆ )
+ ( > + ∆ ) +



















and, for the sample of partially disabled individuals that are employed,
∑βW a t T α I a a a ψ t
γ I T T t T T
γ I t T T ε
( , , ) = + + ( < ≤ ) ( )
+ ( − ∆ < ≤ + ∆ )
+ ( > + ∆ ) + .



















The successive parts of Eqs. (6) and (7) can be explained as follows.
First, individual fixed effects are denoted by αYand αW , respectively. As
such, we effectively exclude not only individuals without entitlement to
the wage-related period, but also individuals who exit the DI scheme
before the incentive change. Still, one way to exploit ‘between-varia-
tion’ would be to estimate the models without individual fixed effects,
while including controls for all possible lengths of entitlement to the
wage-related benefit period. We follow this strategy as a robustness
check to our model.
Second, the vectors βY and βW denote the effect of calendar time;
these are specified as yearly dummies. Both equations allow for
duration dependence, which is denoted as a polynomial functions of
elapsed durations ψk
Y and ψk
W , that vary across age categories that are
indexed by k (k = 1 ,., K).11 In our benchmark model, we allow duration
dependency patterns to differ between five-year age intervals, with a
and a as lower and upper bounds, respectively.
Third, long-term incentive effects on work incidence and wage
earnings are denoted as γY L, and γW L, , whereas the effects in the months
around the incentive change are denoted as γY S, and γW S, , respectively.
Our model thus assumes that workers can respond to the incentive in a
timeframe around the incentive change. The time window around the
incentive change, T2∆ , is set equal to six months in our benchmark
model, but we also present analyses for different values.
Finally, εit
W and εit
W denote error terms that are assumed to be I.I.D.
Eqs. (3) and (4) can be estimated by standard Fixed Effects (FE)
estimation, allowing for standard errors that are clustered at the
individual level.
4.3. Specification of full work resumption
To estimate the impact of the incentive change on the exit rate into
full work resumption, we specify a linear probability model that
explains the probability of leaving DI benefits within a certain time-
frame.12 Similar to De Groot and Van der Klaauw (2014), we take
advantage of the fact that the length of wage-related benefits was
shortened in 2008 for most UI applications. As these changes differed
with respect the work history of workers — with changes that were
most substantial for those with long employment histories — we can
exploit a difference-in-difference design. In doing so, we use controls
for all possible values of employment histories of workers that are
observed in the data, so as to estimate the isolated impact of the length
of entitlement to the wage-related period. More specifically, we specify
the probability of leaving DI benefits for full work resumption withinM
months after the start of the spell for an individual i with age a, who
starts at calendar time τ as follows:
∑βt M d X h α φ I a a
γ T X δ ε
Pr(~ < = 0, , ) = + + ( = )
+ + + ,











with t∼ as the elapsed DI benefit duration that is observed for individual
i. d denotes a censoring dummy which is equal to one only if the DI
benefit duration t∼ > M and right-censoring applies (and zero other-
wise). For d = 1, duration observations are not included in the
estimation. We also allow for calendar time effects (βτ
R) that apply to
the year of inflow in the DI scheme, and dummy values for all possible
values of age as a proxy for work history in our sample; the effect of
these dummies is denoted by φ. We also include individual controls
that are in matrix X. Finally, the error term, εR, is assumed to be I.I.D.
4.4. Graphical evidence
Our estimation strategy entails a comparison of outcome measures
in the months before and after the end of the wage-related period of DI
benefits. We thus can perform eyeball tests that compare individuals
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Fig. 6. Empirical distribution of usage fractions of the residual earning capacity of
employed workers, measured both three months before and three months after the
incentive change.
10 This is a common assumption in the empirical literature on UI benefit exhaustion
effects (see e.g. Card and Levine, 2000).
11 As we show later on, duration dependence patterns can also be estimated non-
parametrically, as a step function of the number of weeks that have passed with DI
benefits. Regarding the goodness-of-fit of our model, this yields model outcomes that are
virtually equivalent to the semi-parametric method that we employ.
12 The conventional way of modeling durations is by using proportional hazards. This,
however, would require strong semi-parametric assumptions, both on the proportionality
of coefficients and on the interdependence of observed and unobserved effects.
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distances — before and after the moment of the incentive change.
Following this approach, Figs. 7–10 display the incidence of work,
wage earnings of employed workers and the occurrence of DI benefit
exits in a frame of 24 months before and 24 months after the moment
the wage-related period ends. Note that for the sample of workers that
are younger than 45 years of age at the start of their DI spell, this time
interval is reduced to 12 months prior to the incentive change. For this
group of workers, the maximum entitlement to wage-related benefits is
mostly smaller than 24 months.
Panel A of Fig. 7 shows that the fraction of workers that are
employed remains more or less stable until the start of the continuation
phase of DI benefit receipt, at a level between 57% and 58%. This
suggests no sizeable anticipation effects of the incentive change. Next,
we observe an increase in the average work incidence in the year
thereafter, up to a level of about 61%. Panel B indicates that this effect
is confined to workers below the age of 45. Moreover, the increase in
work incidence is associated with jobs featuring wage earnings that are
equal to or exceeding the residual earning capacity — see Fig. 8. Thus,
there no evidence for the ‘bunching’ of jobs with wage earnings below
the residual earning capacity but higher than the 50% condition. This
suggests that workers had limited opportunities to find part-time jobs
that provide sufficient income to meet the 50%-condition.
For changes in wage earnings of employed workers around the
incentive change, the eyeball test provides less clear-cut outcomes.
Panel A of Fig. 9 indicates a modest increase in wage earnings that
starts 12 months before the incentive change and ends nine months
after it. Again, these effects are most visible for workers below the age
of 45 (see Panel B of the figure).
Finally, Fig. 10 portrays the evolution of full work resumption rates
and DI exits for other reasons around the time of the incentive change.
Remarkably, Panel A shows a strong reduction in full work resumption
rates after the incentive change. A possible explanation for this is that
the timing of recovery is correlated with the length of the entitlement
period to wage-related benefits. This particularly holds for younger
workers with shorter entitlement periods and relatively high work
resumption rates in the first years of DI benefits. In addition, Panel B
shows an increase in DI benefit exits for reasons other than full work
resumption in the last months before the increase in incentives. This
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Fig. 7. Average work incidence of partial DI recipients, 24 months before and 24 months
after the incentive change due to exhaustion of wage-related benefits. Full sample (Panel
A) and sample stratified over age categories (Panel B).
Panel A: 0-49% usage of residual earning capacity
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Fig. 8. Average work incidence of partial DI recipients for individuals, stratified with
respect to percentage usage of residual earning capacities, 24 months before and 24
months after the incentive change due to exhaustion of wage-related benefits.
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receipt of pension benefits. For this group, the length of entitlement to
the wage-related period is capped by the pension age.13
In sum, the eyeball test suggest that younger DI recipients with
shorter wage-related entitlement periods are more likely to work and to
earn somewhat higher wages when measured just before and after the
incentive change. As for the evolution of full work resumption rates,
however, the picture seems less clear-cut.
5. Estimation results
5.1. Work incidence
Table 2 presents the estimates for our fixed-effects (FE) models on
the employment probability of partial DI recipients for different model
variants. Column (i), which presents results for our ‘benchmark model’,
uses a timeframe around the incentive change of six months and
reports five-year age intervals for DI duration dependency profiles.
Note that duration dependency profiles are captured by a spline with
four polynomials of the time spent in benefits. This setup yields a
statistically significant effect estimate of the incentive change of 2.6
percentage-points on work incidence.
We obtain similar results if the incentive effect is estimated with
OLS, using dummy values for all possible values of the length of the
wage-related benefit period as controls — see column (ii). Moreover,
the results in columns (iii) and (iv) show that the effect estimates are
robust with respect to the length of the time window around the
incentive change. This indicates that some workers were able to
respond to the incentive at relatively short notice in the months before
and after the incentive change. We thus find no evidence pointing to
either strong ex ante effects or sizeable lagged effects of the incentive
change.
Our estimation results also do not change if we use age intervals for
DI duration dependency profiles that are equal to 2.5 years or 10 years
— see columns (v) and (vi), respectively. It is only if we assume one
single duration dependency profile for all ages that the effect impact is
more substantial. This indicates that at least some degree of stratifica-
tion is needed to obtain consistent estimates of the incentive change
effect. We also re-estimated the benchmark model using a fully
nonparametric specification of the duration dependency profiles of
age groups, using a step function for all possible values of the elapsed
DI benefit duration (see the results in column (ix)). Again, this yields
coefficient estimates that are virtually equivalent to those obtained for
the benchmark model.
5.2. Wage earnings
Table 3 reports the estimation results for the incentive change effect
on wage earnings for the sample of employed DI benefit recipients.
Using the settings of the benchmark model, we find that the incentive
increase at the start of the continuation period results in a significant
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Fig. 9. Average wage earnings of partial DI recipients with employment, 24 months
before and 24 months after the incentive change. Wage earnings in eurocents per day.
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Fig. 10. : Empirical work resumption rates (Panel A) and exit rates for other reasons
(Panel B) of partial DI recipients, 24 months before and 24 months after the incentive
change, stratified over age categories.
13 Obviously, if the length of entitlement to the wage-related period would have been
set equal to the residual duration until the age of 65, one would expect a spike in DI exits
at the moment of the incentive change. For administrative reasons, however, the formal
start of pension benefits is recorded some months earlier than that.
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percentage increase of 1.3% of the average daily wage. To put this
result into a broader perspective, column (ix) shows the estimation
results when we add unemployed workers — with wage earnings equal
to zero — to our sample. This then yields a coefficient estimate of 2.67
euros per day, which corresponds to an increase of 6.3% of the average
wage earnings. Bearing in mind that we estimate a work incidence
increase of about 5% due to the incentive change, the total increase in
wage earnings is thus predominantly driven by increases in work at the
extensive margin.
Again, our main estimation results are robust with respect to
changes in the estimation method, changes in the timeframe around
the incentive change, changes in the classification of age groups with
distinct duration dependency profiles and changes in the specification
of duration dependency. We find effect estimates that are higher only
with one common baseline for the elapsed DI benefit duration.
Our analysis shows that the effect of the incentive change on wage
hours is limited. This finding is not surprising, as almost all employed
workers in our sample earn more than 50% of their residual earning
capacity just before the incentive change. With most of these workers
having wage earnings close to or even somewhat higher than the
earning capacity that was assessed, increases in wage earnings may
result in medical re-assessments and, ultimately, the loss of DI benefits
for those with disability degrees close to 35%. This explanation is also
relevant for other studies that find that disability recipients tend to
Table 3
Estimation results for wages of employed DI recipients (euros per day). Standard errors are in parentheses. */** indicate significance at 5%/1%, respectively.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Estimation
method
Individual FE OLS a Individual FE Individual FE Individual FE Individual FE Individual FE Individual FE Individual FE




6 months 6 months 0 months 12 months 6 months 6 months 6 months 6 months 6 months
Age intervals
baseline
5 years 5 years 5 years 5 years 2.5 years 10 years all 5 years 5 years
Specification
baselines b










































Year dummies X X X X X X X X X
R-squared 0.078 0.070 0.078 0.078 0.079 0.078 0.071 0.078 0.042
# Observations 393,342 371,034 393,342 393,342 393,342 393,342 393,383 393,342 698,589
# Individuals 9,209 8,282 9,209 9,209 9,209 9,209 9,211 9,209 13,060
a Note that OLS estimates are obtained only from the sample of individuals with benefit entitlement to the wage-related period.
b For each baseline per age category, we use four polynomial values of the elapsed DI duration. This yields outcomes that are virtually equivalent to a specification with dummy values
for all possible values of elapsed duration.
c Time-constant controls include gender, household status, the degree of disability, impairment types and all possible values of the length of entitlement to the wage-relate d benefit
period.
Table 4
Estimation results for model of full work resumption of DI benefit recipients, measured in percentage-points. Standard errors in parentheses. */** indicate significance at 5%/1%,
respectively. 12,558 observations.
(i) (ii) (iii)
Effect length wage-related benefit period : all individuals (months)
Within 6 months -0.014 (0.013) -0.014 (0.013) -0.007 (0.014)
Within 12 months -0.027 (0.021) -0.027 (0.021) -0.011 (0.022)
Within 24 months -0.003 (0.027) -0.002 (0.027) 0.034 (0.028)
Effect of length wage-related benefit period: employed individuals (months)
Within 6 months -0.027 (0.032) -0.025 (0.032) -0.047 (0.041)
Within 12 months 0.037 (0.046) 0.040 (0.047) 0.019 (0.054)
Within 24 months -0.029 (0.071) -0.027 (0.071) 0.005 (0.081)
Effect of length wage-related benefit period: unemployed individuals (months)
Within 6 months -0.021 (0.015) -0.020 (0.015) -0.008 (0.016)
Within 12 months -0.047* (0.024) -0.045 (0.024) -0.016 (0.024)
Within 24 months -0.027 (0.030) -0.023 (0.030) 0.024 (0.031)
Age dummies X X X
Other individual controls a X X
Year effects X X X
Year effects x age categories
(5-years)
X
a The other time-constant controls that are used include gender, household status, all possible degrees of disability and impairment types.
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avoid exceeding income thresholds (Campolieti and Riddell, 2012;
Weathers and Hemmeter, 2011; Bütler et al., 2015).
5.3. Full work resumption
Table 4 presents the estimation results of the linear probability
model for full work resumption. Incentive effects are measured after
six, 12 and 24 months of benefit receipt for the sample including all DI
recipients and separately for those with and without employment at the
start of the DI spell. The effect estimates display the percentage-point
effect of a one-month increase in the entitlement period to wage-
related benefits. The results in the table allow us to safely conclude that
the impact of the length of the entitlement period to wage-related
benefits on work resumption is small and insignificant. For instance,
the impact of a standard deviation in the entitlement periods — which
equals about 12 months — reduces the return-to-work probability for
the full sample of DI recipients after 12 months only by 0.027*12 = 0.3
percentage-point. Our findings are robust with respect to the inclusion
of various individual controls and a flexible specification of year effects
that is interacted with age categories (see columns (ii) and (iii),
respectively).14 Regarding the sample of unemployed DI recipients
who are expected to be affected the most by the incentive change, we
also find no significant effects. This renders it likely that DI recipients
avoided losing their benefits if they consider that their disability degree
drops below 35% of their pre-disability earnings — as we argued earlier
in the previous section.
5.4. The implied elasticity of labor force non-participation
In the literature, empirical analyses typically derive the ‘labor force
non-participation’ elasticity to compare labor supply responses with
changes in financial incentives. In the current context, the most
straightforward way to derive this labor force non-participation
elasticity is by relating the coefficient estimate for the incentive change
effect on non-participation, which is equal to γ− Y L, , to the percentage
change in the incidence of non-participation of DI benefit recipients













with YT and CRRT as the average work incidence and average condi-
tional replacement rate of workers in the month of the incentive
change, respectively.
The implied labor force non-participation rate that follows from Eq.
(9) equals 0.12. This value is comparable to Kostol and Mogstad
(2014), who examine the full population of DI recipients in Norway. On
the one hand, one may argue that our analysis focuses on a specific
group of workers that were deemed to have substantial residual earning
capacities, thus showing higher elasticity rates. On the other hand,
however, one should bear in mind that a priori employment rates of the
partially disabled workers were already high at the start of DI receipt. If
there was heterogeneity in labor market opportunities among indivi-
duals with partial DI benefits, there may have been limited room for
additional increases in employment.
With changes in conditional replacement rates that vary across
individuals, we can also test the hypothesis that employment effect are
proportional to the size of the incentive change that individuals are
facing. We do so by extending and re-estimating the model for the work
Table 5
Heterogeneous responses in work incidence. Standard errors in parentheses. */**
indicate significance at 5%/1%, respectively.
Coefficient estimate Labor force
non-participation
elasticity
All 0.026** (0.0044) 0.123
Male 0.024** (0.0046) 0.144
Female 0.019** (0.0050) 0.198
Age categories
age < 35 0.050** (0.010) 0.513
35 < age ≤ 45 0.039** (0.0093) 0.294
45 < age ≤ 55 0.0058 (0.0055) 0.046
55 < age ≤ 65 0.0084 (0.0056) 0.050
Married 0.016** (0.0045) 0.122
Non-married 0.027** (0.0051) 0.200
Impairment types
Neoplasms 0.015 (0.012) 0.254
Mental/behavioral disorders 0.032** (0.0063) 0.197
Diseases circulatory system 0.015* (0.0074) 0.113
Diseases musculoskeletal 0.019* (0.0089) 0.128
Other 0.015* (0.0061) 0.140
Disability degree
35–45% 0.0077 (0.0058) 0.066
46–55% 0.017** (0.0058) 0.142
56–65% 0.030** (0.0079) 0.204
65–80% 0.034** (0.0079) 0.178
Pre-disability wages
< 125 euros per day 0.018** (0.0048) 0.286
≥ 125 euros per day 0.023** (0.0047) 0.116
Length wage- related period
< 13 months 0.039** (0.011) 0.258
12–24 months 0.024** (0.0062) 0.171
25–36 months 0.0081 (0.0044) 0.063
> 36 months 0.0078 (0.0053) 0.055
Cohorts
2006–2007 0.026*** (0.0054) 0.134
2008–2012 0.026*** (0.0079) 0.151
Table 6
Estimated work incidence responses for levels of earning capacity usage (rows = usage at
time of start DI spell; columns = usage at time of incentive change). Coefficients are
rescaled as a fraction of the full sample. Standard errors in parentheses. */** indicate
significance at 5%/1%, respectively.
Wage earnings at moment of incentive change, as a
percentage of residual earning capacity
Wage
earnings at
start of DI as
% of earning
capacity a






0% -0.026** 0.0013 0.0073** 0.018** 1.95**
(0.0028) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.224)
0–49% -0.0002 -0.0026* 0.0008 0.0019 0.183
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.098)
50–99% 0.0005 -0.0006 -0.011** 0.011** 0.245
(0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.145)
100% or more -0.013** 0.0011 0.0033* 0.0082** 1.16**
(0.0020) (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.168)
Full sample b -0.026** 0.0010 -0.0033 0.029** 2.676**
(0.0044) (0.0022) (0.0041) (0.0045) (0.387)
a To avoid endogeneity problems that would occur if wages are measured instanta-
neously, we take residual earning capacity usage at the start of DI benefits as a reference
point.
b Note that the coefficient estimates of the incentive for separate samples (0%, 0–49%,
50–99% and 100% or more) do not add up to the coefficient estimate for the full sample.
This can be explained by the fact that the shares of the subgroups are different at the time
of the incentive change than at the start of DI spells.
14 In addition, we estimated a Cox proportional hazard model on DI benefit spells to
investigate the effect of the incentive change, using a dummy variable for the period after
the incentive change. When allowing for baselines to differ between age categories with
intervals of five years, we find insignificant effects of the incentive dummy. The results of
this model are available upon request.
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incidence model with an incentive effect (described by η )Y that is
proportional to the change in the log conditional replacement rate:






If work incidence effects at the moment of benefit exhaustion can be
fully explained by the incentive change, one would expect that the
remaining (constant) effect is equal to zero (γY = 0). 15 Moreover, the
coefficient estimate of ηYcan be used to derive the labor force non-















Column (viii) of Table 2 shows the estimation results of the
extended panel regression model that includes the log change of the
conditional replacement rate as an explanatory. The dummy variable
coefficient that measures the remaining incentive effect becomes
insignificant, suggesting that work effects are indeed proportional to
the incentive change. In addition, the coefficient estimate of the effect
of the log conditional replacement rate implies a labor force non-
participation elasticity that is equal to 0.10, which is close to the
estimate of our benchmark model.
5.5. Heterogeneous responses
To shed more light on heterogeneity in responses to the incentive
change, we re-estimated our benchmark model of work incidence for
different samples in our data.16 As Table 5 shows, implied labor force
non-participation elasticities are most substantial for individuals that
are female, young, non-married and feature low pre-disability earnings
and shorter wage-related benefit periods. Additional analyses that
interact the incentive effect with all relevant controls reveal that age
is the dominant explanatory variable for the size of the employment
incentive effect.17 In particular, the inclusion of age as an additional
control yields small and insignificant effects of the length of the wage-
related benefit period.18 This suggests that age in itself, rather than the
length of the wage-related benefit period, determines the responsive-
ness to incentives.
Table 5 also shows that DI recipients with mental and behavioral
disorders respond relatively strongly to the incentive change. This
contrasts e.g. with Kostol and Mogstad (2014), who find a lower
elasticity rate for the all DI recipients in Norway — using a dataset
that also includes fully disabled workers. Strikingly, the effect
estimate of the incentive change on employment increases with the
disability degree of DI recipients. Again, one explanation for this
may be that disabled workers with a disability degree close to the
threshold value of 35% face a higher risk of losing DI benefits
altogether if they start working. We also estimated our benchmark
model for worker cohorts that entered the partial DI scheme before
and after the 2008 reform. This yields effect estimates that are
virtually equal in both periods. In light of the reduction in entitle-
ment that affected predominantly older workers with long employ-
ment histories, this finding confirms the idea that the incentive
response is driven by age, not by the entitlement length to the wage-
related period of DI benefits.
Finally, Table 6 shows the incentive response for samples of
individuals with four different levels of usage of their residual
earning capacities. Depending on their work status at the start of
DI receipt, individuals are categorized into four groups (in rows):
not working, wage earnings between 0% and 49% of the earning
capacity, wage earnings between 50% and 100% of the earning
capacity and wage earnings equal to or higher than the residual
earning capacity. For these groups we estimate the incentive impact
on the same four work incidence classes as outcome variables (these
are presented in the columns) — but then excluding the first month
of benefit receipt as observations. To present size effects that apply
for the sample as a whole, we rescale coefficient estimates with the
fraction of individuals in the respective groups — also measured at
the start of DI receipt.19
We infer from Table 6 that those individuals without sufficient wage
earnings to meet the 50% condition at the start of DI receipt do, in fact,
respond by earning sufficient wages—which ensures the continued
receipt of partial DI benefits that are wage-related. Also, individuals
that worked at the start of DI receipt and would have stopped earning
wages otherwise, decide not to do so. More strikingly, response effects
on work incidence are not significant for employment with earnings
higher than 50% but below 100% of the residual earnings capacity.
Given the strong incentive to earn more than 50% of the earnings
capacity, one may expect a higher impact on this margin. It thus seems
that individuals had limited opportunities to find part-time jobs to
meet the 50% criterion only. Finally, we find that the group using
between 50% and 100% of their residual earning capacity shows a shift
toward the group of workers that uses 100% or somewhat more. As
these workers already met the 50% condition, they probably responded
to the loss of (partial) UI benefits.
6. Summary and policy implications
This study provides insight into the responsiveness of disabled
workers to a dramatic increase in financial work incentives during
their DI benefit spell. We focus on workers receiving partial DI
benefits in the Netherlands that have substantial residual earning
capacities. To investigate whether the incentive change affected the
outcome measures of interest, we disentangle incentive effects from
other changes in the ability to work that are unrelated to the
incentive. We do so by exploiting the variation in the length of the
wage-related period of individual workers, which allows us to
compare changes in outcome measures of ‘treated’ individuals (those
close to or after the end of the wage-related period) with the control
group of individuals (those who are not or have not yet been affected
by the incentive change).
According to our estimates, the incentive effect at benefit
exhaustion is equal to 2.5 percentage-points for the full sample of
partially disabled workers. This effect corresponds to a labor force
non-participation elasticity estimate that is equal to 0.12. The effect
is concentrated in a time window of only six months around the
incentive change, suggesting that anticipation effects before the
incentive change and adaptation effects after the incentive change
were limited. Still, the incentive change has only a small impact on
the earnings of DI recipients who work and has no significant effect
on the exit rate out of DI benefits. From this, we infer that employed
workers preferred partial DI benefits to be supplemented by wage
earnings, rather than receiving wage earnings from full employment.
There are at least three policy implications that can be drawn
from our analysis. To start with, the impact estimate of the change in
financial incentives is small when compared to the group of workers
15 Related to this argument, the coefficient estimate of γY also provides a test on the
presence of measurement errors in the conditional replacement rate (as discussed in
Section 3). If measurement errors cause attenuation bias in ηY , this is likely to be
compensated by higher value estimates of the ‘constant’ effect of the incentive change, γY .
16 We also ran regressions on wage earnings of employed workers for various
subsamples. Generally, effect estimates were small and variation across groups was
limited.
17 For expositional reasons, estimation outcomes of the employment model with
interacted incentive effects are not included in this paper. They are available upon
request.
18 Similar to the model that explains exit rates out of the DI scheme, the effect of the
entitlement period to the wage-related period is then identified from the reform of 2008.
19 As the fractions of these four groups may change over the benefit spell, adding
coefficient values per outcome variable may lead to outcomes that deviate from the effect
for the full sample.
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that is already employed. Even though the incentives were targeted
at individuals with residual earning capacities, labor elasticities are
comparable to those obtained by Kostol and Mogstad (2014) for
disabled workers with much lower a priori employment rates. In
contrast, the majority of individuals with wage earnings and partial
DI benefits in our sample succeeded in maintaining employment in
the sickness period that precedes DI benefit claims. Rather than the
financial incentives, it was thus employers who played a key role in
maintaining work for partially disabled workers in the sickness
period.
Second, our findings confirm results from earlier studies that
disabled workers respond positively to earnings disregards and wage
subsidies complementing DI benefits, rather than allowing these to
induce them to exit the DI scheme (Campolieti and Riddell, 2012;
Weathers and Hemmeter, 2011). Partially disabled workers in the
Dutch DI scheme had an interest in exploiting their residual earning
capacity, but probably avoided the imposition of medical re-assess-
ments that would lower their DI benefits. This calls either for a more
frequent and focused use of medical re-assessments in order to prevent
cash-cliffs (Moore, 2015) or for incentive schemes that reward full
work resumption.
Finally, we find incentive response effects to be confined to
younger workers with lower entitlement periods to the wage-related
period of DI benefits. When controlling for age effects, however,
there is no evidence that longer entitlement periods in itself lead to
lower effects. Consequently, the employment effects of shortening
entitlement to the more generous wage-related period are probably
limited.
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